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Case Note
FAMILY LAW—When Circumstances Change, but the Court Does
Not; Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (Wyo. 2015)
Nicholas S. Bjorklund *
“An error does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation, nor does the
truth become error because nobody will see it.”
—M. K. Gandhi 1

I. Introduction
A just society must apply its laws in a uniform way, otherwise it risks
devolving into tyranny.2 While a court of last resort serves the important function
of protecting minority rights in a system of majority rules, it should be careful not
to overreach and threaten the principle of majority rule.3 When a court fails to
interpret a statute as the legislature intended it to be understood by the people, it
violates that principle.4
In early 2015, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided the case Kappen v.
Kappen.5 The court held that the modification of custody statute in Wyoming—
Wyoming Statute section 20-2-204—requires a showing that a change in
circumstances must affect the life of the child before it can be used to justify a
modification.6 Because the trial court did not discuss how the factors it considered
affected the welfare of the child, the court reversed.7

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2016. I want to thank
Audrey for her patience and support, the editors of the Wyoming Law Review for their hard work,
and Professor Danielle Cover for her invaluable insights.
1
26 Mahatma Gandhi, Notes (26-2-1925), in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi
200, 203 (1967), https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/cwmg_volume_thumbview/MjY=#page/
232/mode/2up.
2
See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“There can be no free society without law administered through an independent judiciary.”).
3

See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 311–13 (1987).

See id. While Chief Justice Rehnquist’s discussion is focused on the invalidation of statutes
for unconstitutionality, the principle of respecting majority rule when possible nonetheless holds
true. See id.
4

5

Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (Wyo. 2015).

6

Kappen, ¶¶ 15–16, 341 P.3d at 382.

7

Id. ¶¶ 32–33, 341 P.3d at 386.
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At first blush, this case is not particularly remarkable. The court announced
a standard of review, stated the rule, cited a string of cases that stated the same
rule, and applied the rule to the facts under the applicable standard of review.8
However, a review of the cases cited in the opinion indicates a troubling reality
in Wyoming case law. The language the court relied on—“a material change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child”—does not appear in the statute.9
It is a relic of the pre-statutory common law standard that the court developed.10
Wyoming courts are required to apply statutes that abrogate the common law
without reference to the earlier common law standards.11 Because the legislature
enacted a custody modification statute that deviated from the common law,
the court should have abandoned its earlier standard.12 The Wyoming Supreme
Court erred when it applied the pre-statutory standard for custody modification
in Kappen. The court must remedy this error by abandoning its prior case law and
interpreting the custody modification statute as the legislature intended.
This case note first discusses the history of custody modification in Wyoming,
followed by a discussion of the rules of statutory interpretation.13 Next, it provides
a summary of the holding and analysis in Kappen.14 Finally, this case note
argues that the court erred in Kappen, details how the statute should have been
interpreted, and proposes an interpretation of the statute that is consistent with
the legislature’s intent.15

II. Background
A. Modification of Custody Orders: A History
For decades before 2000, custody modification was left largely to the
discretion of the courts.16 The only statute in effect at the time simply granted

8

See generally Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (Wyo. 2015).

Compare id., with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015) (emphasis added) (“A court
having jurisdiction may modify [a custody order] if there is a showing by either parent of a material
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question . . . .”).
9

10

See Kappen, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d at 382 (citing to cases creating or applying the pre-2000 standard).

See Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961– 62 (Wyo. 1973) (“There can be no doubt
about the correctness of the general rule . . . that the common law obtains only when not changed
by statute, and statutes take precedence where there in [sic] any [i]nconsistency or conflict with the
unwritten law.”); see also 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 16 (2015). This issue will be covered in more
depth below, see infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
11

12

See Schlattman, 511 P.2d at 961– 62.

13

See infra notes 16–51 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 53–88 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 89–150 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (1999); see also Laughton v. Laughton, 259 P.2d 1093,
1095 (Wyo. 1953) (quoting Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-5915 (1945)).
16
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the district court continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody order “as the
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children requires.”17 The
Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted this statute to mean that a custody
order may not be modified without the movant showing a material change in
circumstances that affects the welfare of the child.18 The cases reciting this rule
generally predate the current custody modification statute.19
The previous statute granted broad discretion to the courts in deciding custody
issues.20 The Wyoming Supreme Court responded to this grant of discretion by
adopting a rule: The party arguing that custody should be modified had the burden
of showing, first, that there was a change in circumstances and, second, that the
change warranted modification of the order.21 Over time, this rule developed to
require a showing of a substantial or material change in circumstances affecting
the welfare of the child.22 By early 2000, the rule required the moving party to
prove four elements: “[A] substantial or material change in circumstances which
affects the child’s welfare,” the change occurred after the original order, “the
change warrants modification of the decree, and that the modification will be in
the child’s best interests.”23
Today, child custody is purely a creature of statute.24 A district court may only
reopen a custody order if there has been a “material change in circumstances since
the entry of the order.”25 Specifically, the custody modification statute states:
A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the
care, custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing
17

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (1999).

See, e.g., Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d 377, 382 (Wyo. 2015); Cobb v.
Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Sorensen v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo. 1997)).
18

19
See, e.g., Cobb, 2 P.3d 578 (decided in early 2000); Sorensen, 944 P.2d 429 (decided in
1997); DJG v. MAP, 883 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 312–13 (Wyo.
1989)); but see Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (decided in 2015).
20

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113.

21

Laughton, 259 P.2d at 1095.

See, e.g., Cobb, 2 P.3d at 579–80; Sorensen, 944 P.2d at 432; Wilcox-Elliott v. Wilcox, 924
P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1996).
22

23

Cobb, 2 P.3d at 579–80 (citation omitted).

Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 17, 280 P.3d 1186, 1192–93 (Wyo. 2012) (“[I]t is well
settled that divorce is purely a statutory process, with courts having no authority in such proceedings
other than that provided by statute.” (citation omitted)); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c)
(2015); Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 13, 293 P.3d 440, 444 (Wyo. 2012). Custody orders and
issues may arise in cases that do not involve a divorce or marriage. See, e.g., JT v. KD, 2008 WY 104,
¶ 5, 192 P.3d 969, 970 (Wyo. 2008). The Wyoming Supreme Court treats custody modification as
an equally statutory process as divorce. See, e.g., Hanson, ¶¶ 17–18, 280 P.3d at 1192–93; Weiss v.
Weiss, 2009 WY 124, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d 408, 411–12 (Wyo. 2009).
24

25

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c).
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by either parent of a material change in circumstances since
the entry of the order in question and that the modification
would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S.
20-2-201(a). In any proceeding in which a parent seeks to
modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, proof of
repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow
visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be
considered as evidence of a material change of circumstances.
Any modification under this subsection shall be subject to the
limitations and requirements of W.S. 20-2-205.26
The moving parent must also show that the modification would be in the best
interests of the child.27 While the welfare of the child is important to a custody
modification, Wyoming law requires the district court to find a material change in
circumstances before it may consider the best interests of the child.28
Custody modification is exclusively governed by statute, and must be
interpreted as such.29 The Wyoming Supreme Court often mentions the statute
when discussing custody modification cases, but not always.30 The failure of the
court to apply the applicable statutory standard demonstrates the problem; namely
that the Wyoming Supreme Court does not always interpret statutes according to
its own rules and so ordinary citizens are unable to accurately predict the legal
consequences of their decisions.31

B. The Wyoming Rules of Statutory Construction
Interpreting statutes is important work, and may be the most common activity
engaged in by judges.32 It is important because correctly interpreting statutes is
essential to the orderly functioning of a democratic society.33 The legislature, the
elected representatives of the people, enacts statutes and thereby puts people on

26

Id.

27

Id.

See Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 13, 341 P.3d 377, 382 (Wyo. 2015); Arnott, ¶ 14,
293 P.3d at 445. Because a finding of a material change in circumstances is required before the best
interests of the child can be considered, this analysis will not discuss the best interests of the child.
See Kappen, ¶ 13, 341 P.3d at 382.
28

29

See Hanson, ¶ 17, 280 P.3d at 1192–93.

Compare, Kappen, ¶ 13, 341 P.3d at 382, and Arnott, ¶ 13, 293 P.3d at 444, and Hanson,
¶ 17, 280 P.3d at 1192–93, with Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, ¶¶ 8–12, 96 P.3d 21, 25–26
(Wyo. 2004) (discussing a custody modification case without citing the governing statute).
30

31

See infra notes 103–21 and accompanying text.

32

See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 13–14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).

33

See id. at 17.
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notice of the law.34 When a court interprets a statute, it is under a duty to interpret
that statute in the way that the legislature intended the public to understand it;
this is the essence of democracy.35
According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the principles of statutory con
struction are “well-known and accepted.”36 A court’s primary goal in interpreting
statutes is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.37 The court is restrained,
however, in its search for the legislature’s intent by the language of the statute.38
First, the court must determine the “ordinary and obvious meaning of the words
employed according to their arrangement and connection.”39 If the statute is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court must resort to
general principles of statutory construction.40 When the statute is unambiguous,
however, the court is bound to apply the legislature’s intent as expressed in the
statute.41 The Wyoming Supreme Court’s standard for ambiguity contemplates
an objective standard: whether reasonable people can agree on the meaning of the
statute consistently and predictably.42
When courts are forced to resort to principles of statutory construction,
they “construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and
sentence.”43 They also construe all parts of statutes together in pari materia.44
Courts look to the purpose of the statute, the historical setting surrounding its
enactment, Wyoming public policy, and any other facts or circumstances existing
before or at the time of enactment.45

34

See id.

35

Id.

36

Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291–92 (Wyo. 2004).

See Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo. 1999); see also Dolenc, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d at
1291–92.
37

38
See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.
1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 821 (Wyo. 1897) (As Justice Potter explained:
“[T]he intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law . . . . Such intent, however,
is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute or instrument under consideration.”)).
39

Dolenc, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d at 1291–92.

40

Vineyard, 983 P.2d at 1235.

Id. at 1235 (citing State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367,
1369 (Wyo. 1997)).
41

42
Parker Land & Cattle, 845 P.2d at 1043 (“A ‘statute is unambiguous if its wording is such
that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistence and predictability.’”
(citation omitted)).
43

Vineyard, 983 P.2d at 1235.

Id. In pari materia means that statutes relating to the same subject are construed together
so that ambiguities in one statute are resolved by looking at the other. In Pari Materia, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
44

45

Parker Land & Cattle, 845 P.2d at 1044.
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The legislature is charged with full knowledge of the law and the principles of
statutory interpretation when it enacts a statute.46 Generally, implied abrogation
of the common law is disfavored.47 This means that statutes are assumed to be
consistent with the common law, unless there is a clear intent by the legislature
to change the common law.48 The Wyoming Supreme Court will infer intent to
change the common law when the language of the statute expressly alters the
common law or necessarily implies such alteration.49 When a statute covers an
entire subject, abrogation of the common law on that subject will be implied.50
Child custody is entirely governed by statute, therefore any statute on the
subject that differs from the common law must be interpreted as abrogating the
common law.51 Despite the foregoing discussion, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has continued to apply the pre-2000 standard, without any discussion of why it
believes this is the controlling law, and this outdated standard led the court to
error in Kappen v. Kappen.52

III. Principal Case
In February 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Kappen divorced.53 The district court granted
the mother primary custody of the children and granted the father standard
visitation.54 Both parents lived in Lingle, Wyoming following the divorce.55
In January 2013, the mother was convicted of stealing a cell phone from a
coworker and was fired from her job.56 The mother remained unemployed at the
time of the lower court hearing.57 According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, the
mother was financially secure despite not being employed.58

46

Id.

See Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 34, 86 P.3d 270, 285–86 (Wyo. 2004); Urbach v.
Urbach, 73 P.2d 953, 961 (Wyo. 1937).
47

48

See Merrill, ¶ 33, 86 P.3d at 285; Urbach, 73 P.2d at 961.

49

Merrill, ¶ 34, 86 P.2d at 286.

50

In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 500 (Wyo. 1943).

See Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 17, 280 P.3d 1186, 1192–93 (Wyo. 2012); see also
In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d at 500.
51

52

See infra notes 53–88 and accompanying text.

53

Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 3, 341 P.3d 377, 380 (Wyo. 2015).

Id. ¶ 3, 341 P.3d at 380, 380 n.1. At the time of the original custody order, the parties
had two minor children, but by the time Kappen was decided, one of the children was no longer a
minor. Id.
54

55

Id. ¶ 3, 341 P.3d at 380.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.
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In early 2013, the mother decided to move in with her boyfriend in Denver,
Colorado and to take the child with her.59 The parties’ divorce decree required
the mother to consult with the father on certain matters affecting the child.60 As
the mother began to plan the move and list her home for sale, despite the court
order to consult, she did not discuss her plans with the father.61 In July 2013,
the father filed a petition to modify custody of the child on the grounds that the
mother’s unstable life amounted to a material change in circumstances and that
a modification was in the best interests of the child.62 The district court set a
hearing on the modification for November 25, 2013.63
On August 2, 2013, the mother filed an answer to the petition for modification
and gave notice of her move to Denver with the child.64 In response to the mother’s
move to Denver, the father filed a motion for temporary custody and to prevent
the removal of the child from Wyoming.65 Although the mother knew about the
upcoming hearing on temporary custody, the mother moved the child to Arvada
and enrolled her in school.66 The district court awarded temporary custody to
the father.67 After the district court awarded temporary custody to the father,
the mother moved back to Wyoming in the hope that the move would reflect
positively on her at the modification hearing.68 Upon realizing that returning to
Lingle was a mistake, the mother moved back to Denver.69
The district court held a hearing on the modification and awarded custody to
the father.70 In deciding against the mother, the district court found that there had

59
See id. ¶ 4, 341 P.3d at 380. The court mentions that at some point prior to the mother’s
relationship with this man, she had a relationship with another man. Id. ¶ 8, 341 P.3d at 381.
60
Id. ¶¶ 3–5, 341 P.3d at 380; see also Decision Letter at 2–3, Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d
377 (No. S-14-0092), https://efiling.courts.state.wy.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=16646; Brief of
Appellee at 6, Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (No. S-14-0092), https://efiling.courts.state.
wy.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=16646; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341
P.3d 377 (No. S-14-0092), 2014 WL 3827869 at *4.
61

Kappen, ¶ 4, 341 P.3d at 380.

Id.; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 60, at 5– 6; Brief of Appellee, supra note
60, at 5 (the Father did not mention the move to Denver as a grounds for modification, because he
was not aware of the move at that time).
62

See Decision Letter, supra note 60, at 2; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 60, at 6; Brief
of Appellee, supra note 60, at 6.
63

64

Kappen, ¶ 5, 341 P.3d at 380.

65

See id.

Order on Temporary Custody, Support and Visitation at 1, ¶ 5, Kappen, 2015 WY 3, 341
P.3d 377 (No. S-14-0092), https://efiling.courts.state.wy.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=16646.
66

67

Order on Temporary Custody, Support and Visitation, supra note 66, at 2, ¶ 1.

68

Kappen, ¶ 7, 341 P.3d at 380.

69

Id.

70

Id. ¶ 8, 341 P.3d at 380–81.
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been a material change in circumstances based on the following facts: the mother’s
dismissal from her job for stealing from a coworker, the mother’s conviction for
larceny, the mother’s relationship with one man and subsequent marriage to
another, and the mother’s multiple moves to and from Denver.71 Further, the
district court determined that it would be in the child’s best interest to modify
custody and granted custody to the father.72

A. Majority Opinion
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the district court erred
when it modified a custody order based on a material change in circumstances.73
On appeal, the mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
modifying custody.74 She argued that the district court should have required the
father to show how each of the facts affected the welfare of the child.75 The mother
relied on cases that pre-date the current statutory scheme.76
The court began its opinion by discussing the doctrine of res judicata.77 Res
judicata bars relitigation of issues that were or could have been presented in an
earlier proceeding and is rooted in the doctrine of judicial economy.78 In the child
custody context, however, society’s interest in safeguarding the best interests of
children outweighs its interest in judicial economy and the finality of judgments.79
New facts and circumstances, then, may justify modifying a previous judgment.80

71
Order Modifying Child Custody, Child Support and Visitation at 2, ¶ 6(i), Kappen,
2015 WY 3, 341 P.3d 377 (No. S-14-0092), https://efiling.courts.state.wy.us/public/caseView.
do?csIID=16646.
72

Kappen, ¶ 8, 341 P.3d at 381.

73

See id.

74

See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 60, at 47–48.

75

Id.

See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 60, at 47–48; see also Hanson v. Belveal, 2012
WY 98, ¶ 19, 280 P.3d 1186, 1193 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, ¶ 6,
170 P.3d 86, 89 (Wyo. 2007)); Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2004)
(quoting Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000)). It bears mentioning that all the cases cited
in Kappen by the mother quote or cite to cases that applied the standard that was developed before
the 2000 statute was passed. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 60; see, e.g., Hanson, ¶ 19,
280 P.3d at 1193 (quoting Morris); Morris, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d at 89 (citing Jackson); Jackson, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d
at 24 (quoting Cobb); Cobb, 2 P.3d at 579 (predating the 2000 statute).
76

77

Kappen, ¶¶ 12–14, 341 P.3d at 381–82.

See id. ¶ 12, 341 P.3d at 381. Judicial economy is a policy consideration favoring the
efficient use of judicial resources. See id. (recognizing the usefulness of res judicata in providing “an
endpoint to litigation and prevents the legal system from becoming so bogged down that nothing
would ever remain decided.” (citation omitted)); see also Judicial Economy, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014).
78

79

See Kappen, ¶ 12, 341 P.3d at 381–82.

80

See id. ¶ 12, 341 P.3d at 382; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015).
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The court recognized that res judicata requires the moving party to establish a
material change in circumstances before the district court may reopen an existing
custody order.81
The court then discussed whether the father had proved a material change
in circumstances outweighing society’s interest in applying res judicata.82 The
court stated: “In examining whether there is a material change in circumstances,
we have required district courts to establish that the change has, in some way,
affected the welfare of the child.”83 Next, the court evaluated each of the changed
circumstances the district court relied on and concluded that the evidence did not
show how any of the changed circumstances affected the child’s welfare.84 After
noting that the relative stability of each parent had not changed since the entry of
the original custody order, the court reversed the district court.85

B. Dissenting Opinions
Two justices—Chief Justice Burke and Justice Davis—dissented from
the majority opinion.86 Chief Justice Burke argued that the majority had not
appropriately applied the standard of review by impermissibly reweighing the
evidence and not granting all favorable evidentiary inferences to the father.87
Justice Davis agreed with Chief Justice Burke on the standard of review issue
and added that the mother’s concession that her move to Denver was a material
change of circumstances was dispositive.88

IV. Analysis
The Wyoming Supreme Court erred in Kappen when it applied a standard
based on case law that deviated from the statutory scheme and reversed an order
granting a custody modification.89 Custody modification should be governed
exclusively by statute because it is a purely statutory process.90 When the legislature

81
Kappen, ¶ 14, 341 P.3d at 382 (alteration in original) (quoting In re TLJ, 2006 WY 28,
¶ 8, 129 P.3d 874, 876 (Wyo. 2006)); see also Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 13, 293 P.3d 440,
444–45 (Wyo. 2012).
82

Kappen, ¶¶ 15–16, 341 P.3d at 382.

83

Id. ¶ 15, 341 P.3d at 382.

84

Id. ¶¶ 17–29, 341 P.3d at 382–85.

85

Id. ¶¶ 30–33, 341 P.3d at 385–86.

Id. ¶¶ 34–41, 341 P.3d at 386–87 (Burke, C.J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 42–55, 341 P.3d at
387–90 (Davis, J., dissenting).
86

87

Kappen, ¶ 39, 341 P.3d at 387 (Burke, C.J., dissenting).

88

Id. ¶ 42, 341 P.3d at 387 (Davis, J., dissenting).

89

See id. ¶ 33, 341 P.3d at 386 (majority opinion).

90

See Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 17, 280 P.3d 1186, 1192–93 (Wyo. 2012).
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enacts a statute that covers an entire subject of the law, if that statute deviates from
the common law standard, then the statute controls.91

A. The Rules of Statutory Interpretation Required the Court
to Apply the Statute as Written
The Wyoming Legislature enacted the current statute governing custody
modification in 2000.92 The statute states that custody may be modified if the
moving party proves “a material change in circumstances since the entry of the
order in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of
the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).”93 In Kappen, however, the Wyoming
Supreme Court applied a common law standard that was in existence before
the current statute.94 Because the prior common law standard differs from the
statutory standard, and custody modification is covered entirely by statute, the
court should not have applied the common law standard.95
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s goal when interpreting statutes is to give
effect to the legislature’s intent.96 The court is also clear that it begins its analysis
by reading the plain language of the statute and applying the obvious and ordinary
meaning.97 When the court does not follow its stated interpretive rules, laypeople
and their lawyers cannot predict the outcome of their cases with any reasonable
certainty.98 Predictability in the law, or at least the illusion of predictability, is
important to society.99 The policy, enshrined in the United States Constitution,
of a separation of powers is based in “a government of laws and not of men.”100
In order for a government based on law to function properly, the people must be
able to understand the law and predict its impact on their lives.101
91

In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 500 (Wyo. 1943).

92

See 2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws 113, 115.

93

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015).

See, e.g., Kappen, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d at 382; Gjertsen v. Haar, 2015 WY 56, ¶ 29, 347 P.3d
1117, 1126 (Wyo. 2015).
94

95

See In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d at 500.

See Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo. 1999); Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Dolenc,
2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291–92 (Wyo. 2004); see also Scalia, supra note 32, at 16.
96

97

See Dolenc, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d at 1291–92.

Compare Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 14, 293 P.3d 440, 445 (Wyo. 2012), with
Kappen, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d at 382. Each of these cases, decided less than three years apart, applies a
different standard for custodial modification to similar facts and comes to a different outcome.
98

See Drury Stevenson, To Whom is the Law Addressed?, 21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev 105,
114 (2003).
99

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Const. pt. I, art. XXX; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
100

101

See Scalia, supra note 32, at 17. Justice Scalia summarized the policy as follows:
And the reason we adopt this objectified version [of legislative intent] is, I think,
that it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with
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The difficulty of citizens to predict the legal consequences of their actions
is illustrated by contrasting Arnott v. Arnott, Kappen v. Kappen, and Jackson v.
Jackson.102 In Arnott, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided whether a custodial
parent’s move out-of-state constituted a material change in circumstances.103
The district court denied the father’s petition to modify custody by applying a
presumption in favor of a custodial parent’s right to relocate with her child.104 The
court noted that the statute required the moving party to show a material change
in circumstances since the entry of the order, and that modification was in the best
interests of the child.105 Next, the court discussed a previous custody modification
case based on the relocation of one parent and rejected the presumption that the
district court had applied.106 The court held that a relocation by a custodial parent,
and the issues associated with a relocation, may constitute a material change in
circumstances justifying consideration of the child’s best interests.107
In other cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not endeavored to apply
the language of the statute, but has instead invoked the test that was developed
prior to the current statutory framework.108 In Jackson, the court considered
whether the district court abused its discretion when it found a material change
in circumstances and that it would be in the best interests of the children to
modify custody.109 Rather than interpret, or even cite, the language of the custody
modification statute in its consideration of the case, the court quoted and applied
the test it developed prior to 2000.110

fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver
meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated . . . . Government by
unexpressed intent is simply tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver.
Id.
102

See infra notes 103–21 and accompanying text.

103

Arnott, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d at 444.

104

Id. ¶ 1, 293 P.3d at 442.

105

Id. ¶ 14, 293 P.3d at 445 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015)).

106

Id. ¶¶ 15–38, 293 P.3d at 445–57.

107

Id. ¶ 40, 293 P.3d at 458.

108

See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, 96 P.3d 21 (Wyo. 2004).

Id. ¶ 8, 96 P.3d at 24. For a discussion of the facts of Jackson, see infra notes 111–21 and
accompanying text.
109

See Jackson, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d at 24. While the test was summarized above, see supra note 23 and
accompanying text; the precise language of the test may be useful to some readers. The test states:
110

A party who is seeking to modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree
has the burden of showing that a substantial or material change in circumstances,
which affects the child’s welfare, occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial
decree, that the change warrants modification of the decree, and that the
modification will be in the child’s best interests.
Jackson, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d at 24 (quoting Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000)).
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Despite discussing the standard requiring a change in circumstances affecting
the welfare of the children, the court found a change in circumstances when
the life of the father, who did not have custody, improved, but there was “no
real change in [the mother’s] circumstances . . . .”111 In Jackson, the parents were
married in 1999, but divorced less than a year later.112 The mother was awarded
primary physical custody of the children and the father was granted standard
visitation.113 The parties continued to live together for some time after the divorce
and eventually relocated to Nevada.114 The parties separated permanently in 2002
and the mother returned to Wyoming.115 The mother changed jobs multiple times,
enrolled in cosmetology school, dropped out and enrolled in a different program,
and was unemployed at the time of the hearing.116 Meanwhile, the father’s
life improved dramatically.117 The father moved for a modification of custody
based on a change in circumstances and won.118 The Wyoming Supreme Court
agreed with the district court that an improvement in the non-custodial parent’s
circumstances, while the custodial parent’s circumstances remained unchanged,
could constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to modify custody.119 The
Jackson case further illustrates the problem in Wyoming custody modification
law.120 Wyoming citizens cannot predict the outcome of their custody cases with
any reasonable degree of certainty because the court applies varying standards
with varying strictness.121
By interpreting the same statute in varying ways, the Wyoming Supreme
Court creates confusion in custody modification that injects uncertainty into
decisions that are already difficult for divorced parents. For example, in Kappen the

111

Id. ¶ 9, 96 P.3d at 24–25.

112

Id. ¶ 3, 96 P.3d at 23.

113

Id.

114

Id. ¶ 4, 96 P.3d at 23.

115

Id.

116

Id. ¶ 5, 96 P.3d at 23.

117

Id.

118

Id. ¶ 6, 96 P.3d at 23.

119

Id. ¶ 20, 96 P.3d at 26.

See supra notes 79–119 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 121–50 and
accompanying text.
120

Compare Jackson, ¶¶ 10–12, 96 P.3d at 25 (requiring a change in circumstances which
affects the welfare of the child, but modifying custody when the custodial parent’s, and therefore
the children’s, circumstances had not changed), and Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 14, 293
P.3d 440, 445 (Wyo. 2012) (not requiring the change in circumstances to affect the welfare of the
child and finding that a relocation by a custodial parent standing alone may constitute a material
change in circumstances), with Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d 377, 382 (Wyo.
2015) (requiring a change in circumstances which affects the welfare of the child, but denying a
modification when the father’s circumstances remained largely unchanged, but the mother had been
convicted of a crime, lost her job, and was relocating to another state).
121
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mother was considering an out-of-state move that would affect the father’s ability
to remain involved in his child’s life.122 A relocation was considered a material
change in Arnott, but was not in Kappen.123 Because of inconsistent applications
of the Wyoming custody modification statute, a custodial parent considering
relocating to a new state for better job opportunities cannot know in advance if he
or she will lose custody because of the move.124 This creates a disincentive for the
custodial parent to seek employment out-of-state even though the relocation may
be beneficial to the parent, the child, and the community.125 If the court adheres
to the rules of statutory interpretation, however, citizens can predict the outcome
of their case and can plan their lives accordingly.

B. Proposal
This case note proposes an application of the statute that abides by the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s stated rules of statutory interpretation. A district court
may modify custody “if there is a showing by either parent of a material change in
circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification
would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).”126
While the best interests of the children are paramount in child custody cases, the
court has stated that res judicata bars consideration of the best interests of the
child unless a material change in circumstances is shown.127
The Wyoming Supreme Court interprets statutes as a matter of law.128 If the
statute is susceptible of only one meaning, then it is applied as it is written.129
The threshold analysis, then, is whether the language of the custody modification
statute is susceptible to more than one meaning.130 The statute requires a “material
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question.”131 Material
has different formulations in different contexts, but all the definitions can be

122

See Kappen, ¶ 5, 341 P.3d at 380.

Compare Kappen, ¶¶ 20–23, 341 P.3d at 383–84 (refusing to recognize an interstate
relocation as a material change in circumstances), with Arnott, ¶ 2, 293 P.3d at 442 (recognizing an
interstate relocation, standing alone, as a possible material change in circumstances).
123

124

Compare Kappen, ¶¶ 20–23, 341 P.3d at 383–84, with Arnott, ¶ 2, 293 P.3d at 442.

See generally Sue Kilpatrick et al., Mobile Skilled Workers: Making the Most of an Untapped
Rural Community Resource, 27 J. Rural Stud. 181, 189 (2011) (discussing a study of integration of
mobile skilled workers into rural communities and recognizing a net positive for the community).
125

126

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015).

127

Kappen, ¶¶ 12–14, 341 P.3d at 381–82; Arnott, ¶ 13–14, 293 P.3d at 444–45.

128

Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo. 1999).

See Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042
(Wyo. 1993).
129

130

Id.

131

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (emphasis added).
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reduced to mean significant, essential, or relevant.132 The ordinary meaning of
material agrees with this definition.133 So, the statute can be rephrased to require
a significant, essential, or relevant change in circumstances since the entry of the order
in question. This means that any non-trivial change in circumstances may be used
to justify modifying custody.
The question still remains whether this is the result intended by the legislature.
The legislature is presumed to know the law and how statutes will be interpreted
when it enacts legislation.134 When it enacted Wyoming Statute section 20-2-204,
the legislature omitted the requirement that a change in circumstances affect the
welfare of the child before it can justify a custody modification.135 So, a change
that is very significant—perhaps one parent losing her job and being arrested for
larceny—could constitute a material change even if it does not affect the welfare
of the child.136
While the language of the statute appears unambiguous and does not lead to
an absurd result when applied as written, one reaches the same result by applying
the canons of statutory construction. One of the instructive principles here is that
courts consider what evil the statute is attempting to remedy.137 In the case of
the custody modification statute, the legislature is attempting to balance society’s
interest in res judicata with society’s interest in protecting children.138 Because
the best interests of the child are paramount in family law issues, changing
circumstances may require a change to the custody arrangement.139

See Gjertsen v. Haar, 2015 WY 56, ¶ 29, 347 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Wyo. 2015) (stating, for
the first time, that a material change in circumstances is one that affects the welfare of the child);
Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 872 (Wyo. 1975) (defining a material fact as one that would have
some impact on the outcome of the case); Material, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
While Gjertsen stated, in a child custody context, that a material change is one that affects the
welfare of the child, Arnott found that an interstate relocation could constitute a material change in
circumstances, articulating the standard as “new issues framed by facts differing from those existing
when the original decree was entered, which preclude the application of res judicata.” Arnott,
¶ 39, 293 P.3d at 457–58, but see Gjertsen, ¶ 29, 347 P.3d at 1126. The diverging views of these
two opinions further illustrates the need for a consistent and reasoned approach to the application
of this statute.
132

133
See Material, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mate
rial (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
134

Parker Land & Cattle, 845 P.2d at 1044.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (containing no language requiring a showing that the
change affect the welfare of the child).
135

136

But see Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 25–26, 341 P.3d 377, 384 (Wyo. 2015).

137

Parker Land & Cattle, 845 P.2d at 1044.

138

See Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 13, 293 P.3d 440, 444–45 (Wyo. 2012).

139

See id.
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It is reasonable to impose barriers to custody modification, but the inherent
sensitivity of custody issues requires the barriers not be too high. Stability in a
child’s life is extremely important, and is an underlying policy to be considered
in custody modification cases, but stability is only one factor to be considered.140
A child should not be left with a parent who is less capable of caring for the
child simply because stability is important.141 If the court is concerned that not
requiring a material change to affect the welfare of the child sets the bar too low,
then it can require more proof that the modification is in the best interests of the
child.142 The proper interpretation of the statute, then, is to view the threshold
analysis of requiring a material change in circumstances as just what it says: a
material change and nothing more.
It is true that most changes that are material will affect the welfare of the child
and most changes that affect the welfare of the child will be material, but imposing
this restriction above what the legislature has required violates the principles of
statutory interpretation. By adding this language, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has violated the separation of powers and has gone beyond interpreting the law.143
In Kappen, the Wyoming Supreme Court should have affirmed the trial court.
There was a significant, relevant, or material change in the circumstances in the
mother’s life.144 As the district court noted, the mother lost her job for stealing
from a coworker, was convicted of larceny, remarried, and relocated out-ofstate.145 Any one of these events was a significant change of circumstances in the
mother’s life; all of them together were a very significant change.146 As the court
has repeatedly pointed out, a material change in circumstances alone does not
end the analysis.147 If the court, after finding a material change, determines that
a custody modification is in the best interests of the child, then it should order a
modification.148 If the court does not believe it is in the best interests of the child
to modify custody, then it should not order a modification.149 But to condition all
the analysis on a detailed discussion of how each factor affects the welfare of the

140

See Kappen, ¶ 12, 341 P.3d at 382.

141

See Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, 96 P.3d 21 (Wyo. 2004).

142

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015).

143

See Wyo. Const. art. II, § 1; see also Scalia, supra note 32, at 17.

See Kappen, ¶ 8, 341 P.3d at 380–81; see also Kappen, ¶¶ 42–48, 52–53, 341 P.3d at
387–90 (Davis, J., dissenting).
144

145

Kappen, ¶ 8, 341 P.3d at 380–81 (majority opinion).

See id. (it could be argued that none of the circumstances in the mother’s life remained the
same as they had been at the time of the divorce decree).
146

147

E.g., Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 41, 293 P.3d 440, 458 (Wyo. 2012).

148

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2015).

149

Id.
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child imposes substantial burdens on the moving, usually non-custodial, parent.
This is not what the legislature intended when it enacted the current custody
modification statute.150

V. Conclusion
The Wyoming Supreme Court erred when it applied case law, rather than
the statute, to deny a custody modification in Kappen v. Kappen.151 The case law
cited by the court in Kappen predates and contradicts the statute and should be
considered abrogated.152 Because the legislature puts people on notice of what the
law is when it enacts a statute, the state’s highest court is duty-bound to interpret
the statute as the legislature intended the people to understand it.153 The court’s
failure to do this prevents laypeople from acting in the way that will produce the
desired legal outcomes.154

150
Compare Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo. 2000), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2204(c). Unfortunately, in Wyoming, legislative history is nearly nonexistent. One can, however,
infer the intent of the legislature from the language of the statute. See Scalia, supra note 32, at 17.
151

See supra notes 89–150 and accompanying text.

Compare supra notes 24–106 and accompanying text, with supra notes 83–84 and
accompanying text.
152

153

See Scalia, supra note 32, at 17.

154

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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